Abstract-Rollback-Dependency Trackability (RDT) is a property that states that all rollback dependencies between local checkpoints are on-line trackable by using a transitive dependency vector. In this paper, we address three fundamental issues in the design of communication-induced checkpointing protocols that ensure RDT. First, we prove that the following intuition commonly assumed in the literature is in fact false: if a protocol forces a checkpoint only at a stronger condition then it must take at most as many forced checkpoints as a protocol based on a weaker condition. This result implies that the common approach of sharpening the checkpoint-inducing condition by piggybacking more control information on each message may not always yield a more e cient protocol. Next, we prove that there is no optimal on-line RDT protocol that takes fewer forced checkpoints than any other RDT protocol for all possible communication patterns. Finally, since comparing checkpoint-inducing conditions is not su cient for comparing protocol performance, we present some formal techniques for comparing the performance of several existing RDT protocols.
Introduction
A distributed computation consists of a nite set of processes connected by a communication network. Processes communicate and synchronize only by exchanging messages through the network. A local checkpoint is a snapshot of the local state of a process, saved on nonvolatile storage to survive process failures. It can be reloaded into volatile memory in case of a failure to reduce the amount of lost work. When a process records such a local state, we say that this process takes a (local) checkpoint. The set of messages and the set of local checkpoints form the checkpoint and communication pattern associated with the distributed computation. A global checkpoint 1] is a set of local checkpoints, one from each process. A global checkpoint M is consistent if no message is sent after a checkpoint of M and received before another checkpoint of M 2] . The problem of computing consistent global checkpoints is important for ensuring application consistency in the presence of failures.
If local checkpoints are taken independently, there is a risk that no consistent global checkpoint can ever be formed from them. This is the well-known problem of domino e ect 4], in which unbounded, cascading rollback propagation can occur during the process of nding a consistent global checkpoint. Many protocols have been proposed to selectively take local checkpoints to eliminate the possibility of domino e ect (see the survey paper 3]). Coordinated checkpointing 2, 5] is one way of avoiding the domino e ect by synchronizing the checkpointing actions of all processes through explicit control messages. In contrast, communication-induced checkpointing protocols 6] achieve coordination by piggybacking control information on application messages. In addition to taking applicationspeci c basic checkpoints, each process can also be asked by the protocol to take additional forced checkpoints, based on the piggybacked information as well as local control variables.
Communication-induced checkpointing protocols can also be used to achieve a stronger property called Rollback-Dependency Trackability (RDT), proposed by Wang 8] . In general, two local checkpoints being not causally related is only a necessary but not su cient condition for them to belong to the same consistent global checkpoint 1, 7] . They can have hidden, zigzag dependencies that make them impossible to belong to the same consistent global checkpoint. A checkpoint and communication pattern satis es RDT if all such hidden dependencies are made on-line trackable by a simple transitive dependency vector. In addition to ensuring domino freedom, RDT has two other noteworthy properties 8, 9]:
(1) it ensures that any set of local checkpoints that are not pairwise causally related can be extended to form a consistent global checkpoint; (2) it enjoys e cient calculations of the minimum and the maximum consistent global checkpoints that contain a given set of local checkpoints. These properties allow RDT to have a wide range of applications including software error recovery 10], deadlock recovery 11], mobile computing 12], distributed debugging 13], nondeterministic computations 14], etc.
The above desirable properties of RDT come at the expense of additional checkpoints and piggybacked information. It is therefore important to investigate the issue of designing e cient RDT protocols that take less forced checkpoints and piggyback less information. A common intuition is that, if a protocol forces checkpoints only at a stronger condition, then it should force less checkpoints overall. More speci cally, if protocol A forces a checkpoint whenever condition Y is true, protocol B forces a checkpoint whenever condition Z is true, and condition Y implies condition Z, then protocol A should always outperform protocol B. In other words, it seems true that we can improve upon a protocol by "sharpening" the condition, usually through piggybacking more causal information on each message. (Note that, throughout this paper, we compare the performance of protocols in terms of the number of forced checkpoints unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.) Moreover, it seems true that we can achieve an optimal protocol that always forces less checkpoints by nding the strongest (or minimal) condition under which any protocol must force a checkpoint to guarantee the RDT property.
In this paper, we prove that the above common intuition is in fact false by constructing counterexamples. Basically, when comparing two protocols, the intuition is only true up to the rst forced checkpoint. Beyond that, the two patterns may diverge and no longer have a common ground for comparing the conditions. For example, a protocol may unnecessarily force a checkpoint at an earlier execution point but end up outperforming other \more intelligent" protocols because it changes the pattern and happens to avoid two forced checkpoints later. Following the same arguments, we also prove that there cannot exist an optimal RDT communication-induced checkpointing protocol. The fact that the common intuition is not valid suggests that comparing the performance of RDT protocols requires more rigorous analytical techniques than a mere comparison of conditions. In this paper, we describe a few such techniques for analyzing existing RDT protocols. The results are not only interesting from a theoretical point of view, but also useful in practice for designing e cient protocols. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 de nes the computational model and introduces the de nition and the elements of Rollback-Dependency Trackability. Section 3 investigates the common intuition and the issue of optimal RDT protocols. Section 4 compares the performance of several existing RDT protocols and depicts a hierarchical graph. Section 5 summarizes the paper.
Preliminaries 2.1 Checkpoint and Communication Patterns
A distributed computation consists of a nite set P of n processes fP 1 ; P 2 ; ; P n g which communicate and synchronize only by exchanging messages. We assume that each pair of processes is connected by a reliable, asynchronous channel with unpredictable but nite transmission delays. Processes fail according to the fail-stop model.
A process can execute internal, send and receive statements. An internal statement does not involve any communication. When P i executes the statement \send(m) to P j ", it puts the message m into the channel from P i to P j . When P i executes the statement \receive(m)", it is blocked until at least one message directed to P i has arrived, after which a message is delivered to P i . Executions of internal, send and receive statements are modeled by internal, sending and receiving events, respectively.
The execution of each process produces a sequence of events, and all the events produced by a distributed computation can be modeled as a partially ordered set with the well-known Lamport's happened-before relation \ Given a distributed computation H, its associated checkpoint and communication pattern consists of the set of messages and the set of local checkpoints in H. Figure 1 shows an example checkpoint and communication pattern ccpat. C i;x represents the xth checkpoint of process P i , where i is called the process id and x the index of this checkpoint. The sequence 
PCM-paths
Given a checkpoint and communication pattern ccpat, it is not necessary to check that every non-causal Z-path is causally doubled to ensure that ccpat satis es RDT. Causally doubling a certain subset of non-causal Z-paths may su ce. An important subset, called PCM-paths, is de ned as follows 15].
De nition 5: A causal path from I i;x to P j is prime if every causal path from I i;x 0 to P j with x x 0 satis es that receive( :last) hb ! receive( :last).
Intuitively, a prime causal path from I i;x to P j is the rst path that includes the interval I i;x in P j 's causal past. A PCM-path m is a Z-path that is the concatenation of a causal path and a single message m, where is prime and send(m) The idea behind this theorem is that, since any new rollback dependency must be rst introduced by a prime causal path, ensuring that all PCM-paths are causally doubled is necessary and su cient for ensuring the RDT property.
We can exploit the following transitive dependency tracking mechanism commonly adopted in the literature 12, 17, 18] to detect the existence of a prime path: in a system with n processes, each process P i maintains a size-n transitive dependency vector (TDV) that contains the current interval index of P i as its i th entry and records the highest-index interval of any other process P j on which P i 's current state transitively depends. This vector is piggybacked on each application message to allow the receiver to detect if a prime path is encountered 8].
According to Theorem 1, in order to satisfy the RDT property, any PCM-path that is not causally doubled needs to be broken by a forced checkpoint. Since such information may not be contained in the causal past of a process when it detects a PCM-path, the checkpointing decision of an on-line RDT protocol based on causal history can only be based on the following notion of visible If a PCM-path is from an interval I i;x to another interval I i;x 0 of the same process P i , we call this PCM-path a PCM-cycle. If x 0 < x, this PCM-cycle can not be causally doubled, and is called a non-doubled PCM-cycle 15]. For example, the path m 5 ; m 4 ] in Figure 1 is a PCM-cycle and is non-doubled. In the remainder of the paper, for the sake of clarity, only PCM-paths from one process to a di erent one are called PCM-paths. Those from a process to itself are called PCM-cycles. Both PCM-paths and PCM-cycles are called PCMconditions. Moreover, a CM-path m is a Z-path that is the concatenation of a causal path (not necessarily prime) and a single message m with send(m) hb ! receive( :last).
Similarly, only CM-paths from one process to a di erent one are called CM-paths. Those from a process to itself are called CM-cycles. Both CM-paths and CM-cycles are called CM-conditions. 
Protocol Performance and Optimality
A natural direction to improve the performance of RDT protocols is to piggyback more causality information on each message and to sharpen the checkpoint-inducing conditions 8, 9]. Intuitively, if protocols A and B force checkpoints under conditions Y and Z, respectively, and Y implies Z, then protocol A should perform at least as well as protocol B. In the rst subsection, we use some counterexamples to show that the above intuition is in fact false. The main reason is that any forced checkpoint will change the given checkpoint and communication pattern and consequently a ect the later condition testings. As soon as two protocols di er in their decision to force a checkpoint, the two resulting checkpoint and communication patterns are no longer the same and possibly strongly diverge in the future. Thus it is perhaps impossible to compare these two protocols. In the second subsection, we use the same counterexample to demonstrate the impossibility of designing an optimal on-line RDT protocol.
Common Intuition is Not Necessarily True
We use two counterexamples to show that the common intuition is not true in general. The rst example focuses on the comparison of checkpoint-inducing conditions, while the second example focuses on the size of piggybacked information. These counterexamples motivate the development of analytical techniques to formally compare protocol performance. for more details about the size of piggybacked control information.) Clearly, CPm forces a checkpoint at a weaker condition than CPn's since PCM-cycles imply CM-cycles.
To demonstrate that CPn may not always outperform CPm, we construct the checkpoint and communication pattern shown in Figure 3 and apply the two protocols to the same pattern. Figure 3 Figure 4 (which is slightly di erent from the one in Figure 3 ). 
No Optimal On-line Protocol
The basic idea behind the two counterexamples is that the rst forced checkpoint taken by the protocol based on the stronger condition makes the CM-path at the far right portion of the pattern become a non-causally doubled PCM-path, which then requires a second forced checkpoint to break it. In contrast, the \unnecessarily" forced checkpoint taken by the seemingly weaker protocol at an earlier portion of the pattern does not give rise to such a scenario. Following the same argument, we now prove that it is impossible to design an optimal on-line RDT protocol. We base our proof on the pattern used in Counterexample 1, which is redrawn in Figure 5 and denoted ccpat a . Since the cycle m 2 m 1 ] is a non-doubled PCM-cycle, we immediately have the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Any RDT protocol must force process P 3 in ccpat a to take at least one checkpoint between points a and b.
Lemma 2: Any RDT protocol, which forces process P 3 in ccpat a to take a checkpoint between points c and b, must also force process P 2 to take another forced checkpoint. Proof : If P 3 takes a checkpoint between c and b, then m 3 becomes prime and the Z-path m 3 m 4 ] becomes a non-causally doubled PCM-path. As a result, P 2 has to take another checkpoint to break this PCM-path in order to satisfy RDT.
Q.E.D.
We then have the following theorem: Proof : An RDT protocol is optimal if and only if, given any checkpoint and communication pattern, no other RDT protocol takes less forced checkpoints. Now consider the checkpoint and communication pattern ccpat a in Figure 5 . Since the RDT protocol CPm in Counterexample 1 needs to take only one forced checkpoint, protocols that force any checkpoint between c and b need at least two forced checkpoints by Lemma 2 and so cannot be optimal. Trivially, protocols that take more than one checkpoint between a and c cannot be optimal either. So an optimal RDT protocol, if any, must take exactly one forced checkpoint between a and c according to Lemma 1. Now suppose there exists an optimal on-line RDT protocol CPo, which must take exactly one forced checkpoint between a and c. Let us consider the pattern ccpat c in Figure 5 Corollary 2: There is no optimal on-line RDT protocol based on causal history. Similarly, since CPn and CPm are based only on transitive dependency tracking, we also have the following corollary, which is more useful in practice because piggybacking more than a dependency vector is rarely used.
Corollary 3: There is no optimal on-line RDT protocol based on transitive dependency tracking.
Techniques for Protocol Performance Comparison
Results from the previous section indicate that the comparison of RDT protocol performance cannot be based on that of checkpoint-inducing conditions. While general techniques for comparing arbitrary RDT protocols remain an open problem, we demonstrate in this section formal approaches to comparing several existing protocols.
FDAS vs. Other Protocols
Wang proposed the Fixed-Dependency-After-Send (FDAS) protocol 8], which essentially breaks all PCM-conditions. In this subsection, we prove that comparing checkpointinducing conditions is in fact su cient for the particular case of comparing RDT protocols against FDAS; that is, FDAS outperforms protocols that force a checkpoint at weaker conditions and protocols that force a checkpoint at stronger conditions outperform FDAS.
We now prove the rst part, starting with four lemmas. Let C f denote all PCMconditions, which form the checkpoint-inducing condition of FDAS. Let CPw denote any protocol that forces a checkpoint at a weaker condition than FDAS's, and let C w denote its checkpoint-inducing condition. By de nition, C f implies C w and we represent this relation as C f ) C w . Given any checkpoint and communication pattern ccpat 0 , let ccpat f and ccpat w represent the patterns produced by FDAS and CPw, respectively. Since adding forced checkpoints cannot make any PC-path (Prime Causal path) become a non-PC path, we immediately have the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Any PC-path in the original checkpoint and communication pattern remains a PC-path in the pattern produced by any RDT protocol. Now we de ne an extra PC-path as a path that was originally a non-PC path but becomes a PC-path due to the forced checkpoints taken by a protocol. We rst prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4: Any extra PC-path in ccpat f is also an extra PC-path in ccpat w .
Proof: Let be any extra PC-path in ccpat f . We will show that must also be an extra PC-path in ccpat w . First, we consider ccpat f . An extra PC-path is produced only when a forced checkpoint is taken before it. Thus there must exist a PC-path condition 1 before send( :first) in ccpat f , which induced FDAS to take a checkpoint to break the C f condition involving 1 . See the illustration in Figure 6 . Since this checkpoint turned into an extra PC-path, we say that \ is produced by 1 " to simplify presentation. Clearly, 1 is in the causal past of . Similarly, 1 is a PC-path either because it is originally a PC-path or because itself is an extra PC-path produced by another PC-path 2 , which is in the causal past of both 1 and . By repeatedly applying the above argument, since the number of messages in the causal past of is nite, we will eventually reach an original PC-path n , as shown in Figure 6 . Now let us consider ccpat w . From Lemma 3, n is also a PC-path in ccpat w . We distinguish two cases upon receiving n :last: either at least one forced checkpoint has been taken since the nearest previous message-sending event e, or none has been taken. In the latter case, since C f is true and C f ) C w , C w is also true and so CPw must force a checkpoint right before receive( n :last). So, in either case, there is at least one forced checkpoint C between e and receive( n :last). The fact that n?1 in ccpat f is an extra PC-path indicates that there is no causal path originating between receive( n :last) and send( n?1 :first), which prevents n?1 from becoming prime. Also, by de nition of e, there is no sending event between e and receive( n :last). Therefore, the forced checkpoint C makes n?1 become an extra PC-path in ccpat w . By repeatedly applying the same argument, we reach the conclusion that is also an extra PC-path in ccpat w .
Q.E.D. Lemma 5: CPw must force at least one checkpoint between any two consecutive forced checkpoints taken by FDAS in a process.
Proof: Let Figure 7 illustrate the two PC-paths that induce two consecutive forced check- points of FDAS in ccpat f . Clearly, with respect to the second PC-path, its nearest previous message-sending event e must occur after the arriving of the rst PC-path. Now let us consider ccpat w . From Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, this second PC-path must also be a PC-path in ccpat w . By using the same argument as in the proof of the previous lemma, CPw must take at least one forced checkpoint C between e and the arriving of the second PC-path. This checkpoint C is between the two consecutive forced checkpoints of FDAS.
Q.E.D.
We now have the following monotonicity property. Q.E.D.
Finally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Any RDT protocol CPw that forces a checkpoint at a weaker condition than FDAS's must always take at least as many forced checkpoints as FDAS. Proof: Given any checkpoint and communication pattern, CPw forces every process to take at least as many forced checkpoints as in the FDAS case, according to Lemma 6. Therefore, in the overall system, CPw takes at least as many checkpoints.
Q.E.D. Next we prove the second part of the claim by following the same approach. Let CPs denote any RDT protocol with a checkpoint-inducing condition C s that is stronger than FDAS's C f condition; that is, C s ) C f . Let ccpat s represent the checkpoint and communication pattern produced by CPs. Parallel to Lemmas 4, 5, and 6, and Theorem 3, we have the following lemmas and theorem for CPs. Lemma 7: Any extra PC-path in ccpat s is also an extra PC-path in ccpat f . Proof: The relation C s ) C f implies that, whenever CPs forces a checkpoint to break the C s condition, it must also see a PCM-condition. By applying this to ccpat s and considering, in ccpat f , the same messages that form such a PCM-condition, exactly the same arguments used in the proof of Lemma 4 can also apply here.
Q.E.D. Lemma 8: FDAS must force at least one checkpoint between any two consecutive forced checkpoints taken by CPs in a process. By induction, the existence of the unbroken m implies an in nite number of unbroken visibly doubled PCM-paths in the causal past of :last, contradicting the fact that the causal history must be nite.
A Family of RDT Protocols
We now apply the results derived in this section to a family of RDT protocols that have been previously proposed in the literature. The hierarchical graph in Figure 9 depicts how they compare with FDAS in terms of both the number of forced checkpoints and the size of piggybacked information. Let #f ckpt(CP) denotes the number of forced checkpoints taken by the protocol CP. A solid arrow from a protocol CP1 to another protocol CP2
indicates that #f ckpt(CP1) #f ckpt(CP2), and a dotted arrow indicates that the size of piggybacked information in CP1 is less than that of CP2. A line with arrows on both ends means equivalent, and a line marked by \X" means incomparable.
The No-Receive-After-Send (NRAS) protocol, proposed by Russell 19, 8] , breaks all CM-conditions and so belongs to the CPw category. From Theorem 3, NRAS always takes at least as many forced checkpoints as FDAS. The same conclusion applies to the Fixed-Dependency-Interval (FDI) protocol 20, 8] , which forces a checkpoint whenever a PC-path is encountered. The Checkpoint-Before-Receive (CBR) 8] protocol forces a checkpoint before every message-receiving event. It can be easily veri ed that both NRAS and FDI outperforms CBR in terms of #f ckpt(CP).
At the other end of the spectrum, we also examine three RDT protocols. 
Conclusions
Since the initial introduction of the concept of Rollback-Dependency Trackability (RDT), designing more e cient RDT protocols and searching for an optimal RDT protocol have become two active research topics. In this paper, we have presented arguably the most inuential results on both topics. We have disproved the common intuition that sharpening the checkpoint-inducing condition necessarily improves protocol e ciency. Consequently, designing sophisticated protocols by increasing the amount of piggybacked causal information may not always be the right approach to reducing the number of forced checkpoints. Moreover, searching for the strongest checkpoint-inducing condition may not be the right approach to devising an optimal protocol. In fact, we have also proved that there cannot exist an optimal RDT protocol.
Since the checkpoint-inducing condition in general cannot be used to evaluate protocol performance, we have demonstrated two approaches to comparing RDT protocols. First, we have shown that the incomparability of some protocols can be easily proven by carefully constructing a small checkpoint and communication pattern and then cutting it at an appropriate place to obtain a sub-pattern. Secondly, we have demonstrated that, by exploiting certain monotonicity properties, performance comparison among a particular set of RDT protocols can actually be based on the comparison of checkpoint-inducing conditions. General, systematic techniques for comparing arbitrary protocols, however, remain an open problem.
